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Piracy and reprisal in Byzantine waters: resolving a maritime
conﬂict between Byzantines and Genoese at the end of the
twelfth century
Daphne Penna*
(Received 15 November 2016; accepted 17 February 2017)
In 1192, Genoese and Pisan pirates under the command of a Genoese corsair
pillaged Venetian ships carrying merchandise and valuable gifts for the
Byzantine emperor from the Sultan of Egypt. This paper examines the
escalation and resolution of this maritime conﬂict between the Byzantines and
the Genoese. Following Genoa’s failure to resolve the incident as requested,
the emperor implemented measures against the Genoese residents of
Constantinople. The solution chosen by the Byzantine emperor bears striking
resemblance to the practice of ius represaliarum, a practice familiar in Western
Europe that would later evolve and inﬂuence international law in medieval and
early modern Europe. The case in focus demonstrates how a merchants’
custom linked to Western Europe was ﬁrst ‘introduced’ into Byzantine practice.
Keywords: Byzantine law; reprisal; piracy; maritime law; Byzantium and the
west; medieval international law
I. The piracy incident and the emperor’s solution
In November 1192, the Byzantine emperor Isaac II Angelos sent a furious letter
to the consuls, senators and citizens of Genoa complaining about an act of
piracy that had occurred within the Byzantine Empire.1 The attack involved
both Genoese and Pisan pirates. Sailing alongside a Pisan vessel, a Genoese
ship commanded by Gulielmo Grasso2 attacked and stole the property of
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
*Lecturer, University of Groningen, Law Faculty, Legal History Department. Email:
d.penna@rug.nl
1The original letter, written in Greek, is preserved in good condition and is kept, together
with its Latin translation, in the state archives of the city of Genoa. For information and
a summary of this document, see Franz, Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmishen
Reiches von 565–1453, 2 Teil (revised by Peter Wirth, CH Beck 1995) 312–13, document
no 1612. This incident is also discussed, amongst others, by Angeliki Laiou, ‘Byzantine
Trade with Christians and Muslims and the Crusades’ in Angeliki Laiou and Roy Parviz
Mottahedeh (eds), The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim
World (Dumbarton Oaks, 2001) 157–59.
2Gulielmo (or Guglielmo) Grasso was later appointed admiral of the Sicilian ﬂeet by the
German emperor Henry VI, following the latter’s succession as king of Sicily (1194–
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Byzantine subjects at the harbour of Rhodes. The pirates then pillaged Venetian
ships that were returning from Palestine and Egypt carrying Byzantine and
foreign envoys and merchants. The ships carried merchandise and many gifts
from Saladin, the sultan of Egypt, for the Byzantine emperor, including
horses, mules, wild and tame animals, balsam, aloeswood and 27 golden
saddles decorated with pearls and other precious stones. It was common prac-
tice for ambassadors in the Near East to travel with valuable presents, presum-
ably as a display of wealth and power and as a feature of the negotiating
procedure.3 The emperor describes how the pirates ﬁrst approached the Vene-
tian ships under the pretence of peace, acting ‘as friends’ before cunningly
boarding the Venetian ships, killing many people, including Byzantine and
foreign merchants and envoys, and stealing all the goods on board.4 The
emperor values the damage against his empire, his brother Alexios, an imperial
ofﬁcer and against the Byzantine merchants and he demands compensation for
losses and punishment for the wrongdoers:5
1197); see David Abulaﬁa, The Two Italies, Economic Relations between the Norman
Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communities (Cambridge University Press, 1977)
212–13. On the use of pirates as admirals and general questions on the role of piracy in
international law in the Middle Ages, see Louis Sicking, De piraat en de admiraal
(Brill, 2014). On medieval piracy, see also Emily Sohmer Tai, ‘The Legal Status of
Piracy in Medieval Europe’ (2012) 10/11 History Compass 838.
3In two former embassies in 1187 and 1188, Saladin sent many gifts to the Byzantine
emperor, including, but not limited to, elephants, leopards, spices and jewels. For a detailed
account, see Charles M Brand, ‘The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185–1192: Opponents of the
Third Crusade’ (1962) 37(2) Speculum 167. See also Anthony Cutler, ‘Gifts and Gift
Exchange as Aspects of the Byzantine, Arab, and Related Economies’ (2001) 55 Dumbar-
ton Oaks Papers 247; Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld, ‘The Medieval Gift as Agent of Social
Bonding and Political Power: A Comparative Approach’ in Esther Cohen and Mayke B
De Jong (eds), Medieval Transformations: Texts, Power and Gifts in Context (Brill,
2001) 123–56.
4According to some sources, Saladin’s envoys were apparently also carrying a part of the
True Cross: see Brand (n 3) 178.
5The Greek abstract that follows is from Franz Miklosich and Josef Müller, Acta et diplo-
mata graeca medii aevi – sacra et profana, 6 vols (Vienna 1860–90; repr Aalen 1968) vol 3,
doc no VI, 39/25–40/5; and the Latin translation in Cesare Imperiale di Sant’ Angelo,
Codice diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova dal MCLXIII al MCLXXXX, 3 vols (Istituto
Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1942) vol 3, doc no 25, 81/9–21: ‘Edocet igitur haec vos
maiestas mea et reposcit a vobis iuxta foedus nostrum de interfectis ultionem et rerum
omnium satisfactionem. quod si non compensabuntur haec omnia ab iis qui Constantinopoli
inveniuntur Genuensibus, quos in libertate usque adhuc et in omni securitate tuetur maiestas
mea in possessione immobilium Genuae donatorum intra Constantinopolim existentes
observat solas merces ipsorum in securo ponens ut ab ipsis vendantur, sicut ipsi et ad
quos velint, et pretium eorum deponatur, ut si cura vestrae regioni non fuerit vindictae
tali debitae facinori et rerum omnium satisfactionis, compensetur ex iis maiestas mea et
qui fuerunt in istis navigiis mercatores et exinde rursus sit erga vos maiestatis meae bene-
volentia, si vultis, salva et secura.’
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… ἀναδιδάσκει γοῦν ταῦτα ὑμᾶς ἡ
βασιλεία μου, καὶ ἐπιζητεῖ ἐξ ὑμῶν
κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν ὑμῶν τήν τε ἐπὶ
τοῖς ἀποκτανθεῖσιν ἐκδίκησιν καὶ τὴν
τῶν πραγμάτων πάντων ἱκάνωσιν· εἰ δὲ
μὴ ἱκανωθήσεται ταῦτα πάντα ἀπὸ τῶν
ἐν τῇ Μεγαλοπόλει παρευρεθέντων
Γεννουϊτῶν, οὓς ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ μέχρι καὶ
νῦν καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀδείᾳ διαφυλάττει ἡ
βασιλεία μου καὶ ἐν κατασχέσει τῶν
δεδωρημένων τῇ Γεννούᾳ ἀκινήτων
ἐντὸς τῆς Μεγαλοπόλεως ὄντας,
διατηρεῖ μόνας τὰς πραγματείας αὐτῶν
ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ θεμένη, ὥστε παρ’ αὐτῶν
διαπωλεῖσθαι, καθὼς ἂν αὐτοὶ καὶ πρὸς
οὓς βούλωνται, καὶ τὸ τίμημα τούτων
ἐναποτίθεσθαι, ὡς ἂν εἰ μὴ φροντὶς τῇ
ὑμετέρᾳ χώρᾳ γένοιτο τῆς ὀφειλομένης
ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀτοπήματι ἐκδικήσεως
καὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων πάντων
ἱκανώσεως, ἱκανωθῆναι ταῦτα ἐξ αὐτῶν
τήν τε βασιλείαν μου καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς
τοιούτοις πλοίοις ὄντας πραγματευτὰς
καὶ ἔκτοτε πάλιν εἶναι τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς
τῆς βασιλείας μου εὐμένειαν, εἰ
βούλεσθε, σῶαν καὶ ἀσφαλῆ.
… therefore my Majesty informs you of
this and requests from you according to
your agreement6 the punishment for the
killed persons and the compensation for
all the goods; and if all these [the
amounts that the emperor asks] will not
be satisﬁed by the Genoese that are in
Constantinople, whom until now my
Majesty keeps in freedom and complete
liberty in possession of the immovable
properties granted to Genoa while they
are in Constantinople, [then my Majesty]
will preserve only their merchandises in
security, in such a way that they can sell
them in the way and to whom they want
and have the price deposited, so that if
your land does not care for restoring what
is claimed because of this outrage and
compensate for all the things, [then]
compensation will be made from these to
my Majesty and to the merchants who
were on board on these ships; and from
that moment my imperial good will
towards you will, if you want, be safe and
secure again.
This is clearly an initial warning on the part of the emperor to the Genoese. He
cautions that if the Genoese do not compensate for the damage caused by the
pirates, then Genoese residents of Constantinople will have to pay the price for
this piracy incident. There must have been a substantial Genoese community in
the Byzantine capital by this time; emperor Manuel I Komnenos had granted
immovable property in Constantinople to Genoese by a privilege act, a so-
called chrysobull, in 1169 and extended these privileges the following year.7
6The emperor most likely refers here to earlier agreements between Byzantium and Genoa,
where it was stipulated that if a Genoese harms a Byzantine subject, this should be reported
to Genoa by the emperor so that Genoa would administer justice. See Dafni Penna, The
Byzantine Imperial Acts to Venice, Pisa and Genoa, 10th–12th Centuries: A Comparative
Legal Study (PhD dissertation, University of Groningen, Eleven International Publishing,
2012) 171–72.
7See Dölger, 2 (n 1) 255–56, docs 1488, 258–59; also docs 1497, 1498. The word chry-
sobull (χρυσόβουλλον) derives from the Greek words ‘χρυσός’ (= gold) and ‘βούλλα’
(= seal) and was used for documents bearing the Emperor’s gold bulla. On the use of the
chrysobull as an act of foreign policy, see Franz Dölger and Johannes Karayannopoulos,
Byzantinische Urkundenlehre. Erster Abschnitt: Die Kaiserurkunden (CH Beck, 1968)
25, 94ff. Especially for the Byzantine documents concerning the Italian cities, see
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The practice of granting immovable properties to foreigners in the Byzantine
capital was born out of the need to provide foreign merchants with lodgings
and landing areas to securely store their merchandise and conduct business trans-
actions.8 Venice, Pisa, Amalﬁ and Genoa had received such grants by the Byzan-
tine emperor and gradually, all three cities established their own quarters in
strategic areas of Constantinople along the Golden Horn.9
Emperor Isaac II Angelos had extended the Genoese property in Constantino-
ple with a chrysobull only several months prior to issuing the letter of complaint
about piracy to Genoa in 1192.10 In the aforementioned abstract, the emperor
refers to these grants of property and emphasises that he has until now allowed
the Genoese to live freely and fully enjoy their property in the Byzantine
capital. The emperor warns that the Genoese’s favoured position in Constantinople
would change if their city did not provide compensation for the damage caused by
the pirates. The emperor also planned to withhold the merchandise of Genoese
residents in Constantinople as security. While the Genoese could sell their mer-
chandise to whomever they chose, their revenues would be deposited so that if
Genoa did compensate for the damages, the emperor and the Byzantine victims
could make use of those revenues to satisfy their losses.
The emperor was also concerned with ensuring the actual punishment for the
pirates. The start of the excerpt draws a clear distinction between the criminal
aspect of the incident, wherein the emperor petitions for the pirates’ punishment
(‘τήν τε ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποκτανθεῖσιν ἐκδίκησιν’), and the civil aspect, in which the
emperor demands payment of compensation for the stolen goods (‘ἱκάνωσιν
τῶν πραγμάτων’). Surviving documents reveal that the letter initiated further
negotiations between Byzantium and Genoa. Unfortunately, the preserved
material does not provide sufﬁcient information about the resulting negotiations
or resolution of this issue between Pisa and Byzantium. In a Byzantine Imperial
letter to the city of Pisa from 1194, the emperor brieﬂy refers to this piracy incident
and names two Pisan pirates. However, he fails to mention the actual damage from
these attacks, the compensation that Pisans should pay or any measure taken
against the Pisans by the emperor.11
also Walter Heinemeyer, ‘Die Verträge zwischen dem Oströmischen Reiche und den ita-
lienischen Städten Genua, Pisa und Venedig vom 10. bis 12. Jahrhundert’ (1957) 3
Archiv für Diplomatik, Schriftgeschichte Siegel- und Wappenkunde 79.
8See Olivia Remie Constable, Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003).
9See Paul Magdalino, ‘The Maritime Neighbourhoods of Constantinople: Commercial and
Residential Functions, Sixth to Twelfth Centuries’ (2001) 54 Dumbarton Oaks Papers 209,
reprinted in Paul Magdalino, Studies on the History and Topography of Byzantine Constan-
tinople (Variorum Ashgate, 2007) III.
10See Dölger, 2 (n 1) 308–10, doc 1609.
11See Dölger, 2 (n 1) 315, doc 1618.
Comparative Legal History 39
The emperor’s warning apparently had little effect on the Genoese for, as a
chrysobull directed to Genoa from 1193 reveals, the emperor took action
against Genoa soon after.12 At the beginning of this document, the emperor
refers once more to the piracy incident.13 He adds that because the Byzantine mer-
chants in Constantinople were increasingly angered and demanding of compen-
sation, the emperor had ordered the Genoese living in Constantinople to pay a
sum of 20,000 hyperpyra14 as a deposit (‘παρακαταθήκη’, as it is referred to in
the act) for damages suffered by Byzantines as a result of this piracy incident.
The abstract of the chrysobull of 1193 reads as follows:
(ἡ βασιλεία μου)… καὶ δὴ τοὺς Γενουΐτας
ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι ἀφεῖσα τῶν λοιπῶν
πραγμάτων αὐτῶν, ἀπόμοιραν ἐξ αὐτῶν
λαμβάνει ὑπὸ ἐγγυηταῖς τοῖς παρ’ αὐτῶν
δοθεῖσι καὶ ὡς παρακαταθήκην τὴν
τοιαύτην ἀπόμοιραν κατέχειν παρ’
αὐτῆς ἐκλεγεῖσιν, εἰς χιλιάδας
ὑπερπύρους εἴκοσι ποσουμένην, ἐπὶ
αἱρέσει τοιαύτῃ, ὡς εἰ μὲν εἴδησιν
λαβόντες τοῦ συμβάντος οἱ ἔποικοι τοῦ
κάστρου Γενούας εἰς ἐκδίκησιν
διεγερθεῖεν τοῦ πράγματος,
ἀποδοθήσεται τούτοις ἡ κατασχεθεῖσα
ἀπόμοιρα, εἰ δὲ ἀμελῶς περὶ ταύτην
διατεθεῖεν, ἔσονται αἱ τοιαῦται εἴκοσι
χιλιάδες ὑπέρπυροι παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαῖοις
εἰς ἱκάνωσιν τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν.15
[and my Majesty]… allowing the Genoese
to keep the rest of their things, it receives
part of them in the care of guarantors
who have been given [by the Genoese]
and have been chosen by my Majesty to
hold this part as a deposit, which counts
twenty thousand hyperpyra, under this
condition that, if the inhabitants of the
city of Genoa, when informed about the
event, are roused into vindicating the
matter, the portion held [by the
guarantors] will be returned to them [to
the Genoese]; if however they neglect to
take care of this, these twenty thousand
hyperpyra will be the property of the
Byzantines as compensation for their
goods.
Several questions arise from this abstract.Whowere the guarantors?Why is the
word ‘deposit’ (‘παρακαταθήκη’ in Greek and ‘depositum’ in the Latin translation)
12The original document in Greek has been preserved and is kept together with its Latin
translation in the state archives of Genoa. For a summary and information on this document,
see Dölger, 2 (n 1) 314–15, doc 1616.
13Here the emperor refers to a single Venetian ship that was carrying presents from the
Sultan as well merchandise and Byzantine and foreign envoys. In the earlier letter
(see n 1) he refers to more Venetian ships.
14The hyperpyron was a gold coin introduced by Alexios I Komnenos in 1092: see Alex-
ander Kazhdan et al, The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium (Oxford University Press,
1991) vol 2, 964–65 with basic bibliography.
15Miklosich and Müller (n 5) doc VII, 42/6–15. See also the Latin translation in Cesare
Imperiale di Sant’Angelo (n 5) doc 35, 103/17, 21–29: ‘(maiestas mea)… et sinens
quidem Genuenses reliquas res suas servare, partem ex ipsis sumit sub vadibus ab iisdem
datis et ab ipsa designatis ad detinendam tamquam depositum huiusmodi partem in hyper-
pyrorum viginti millia computatam. ea conditione ut si incolae civitatis Genuae eventus
notitiam nacti ad facinoris vindictam excitarentur, reddenda esset iis deposita pars. si
vero negligenter circa eam vindictam se se habuerint, erunt huiusmodi viginti millia hyper-
pyrorum apud Romanos in suarum rerum compensationem.’
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used here together with the word ‘guarantors’ (‘ἐγγυηταί’ in Greek and ‘vades’ in
the Latin translation)? Is it then a special kind of deposit? Further, what were the
exact procedures for collecting the money from the Genoese living in Constantino-
ple? For example, did the Genoese community decide on its own which of its
members were to pay and the amount they were to render? No Genoese names or
representatives of the Genoese community are mentioned at this point.
II. The solution of the ‘deposit’ and the ius represaliarum
The aim of this paper is not to investigate all of the aforementioned questions.16
Rather, I would like to focus on one interesting point in the abstract relating to the
emperor’s strategy in resolving the maritime conﬂict with the Genoese. The emper-
or’s order for the Genoese living in Constantinople demanded payment of money
to certain Byzantines as deposit under the following condition: if Genoa did not
resolve thematter, themoneywould be given to those Byzantinemerchants suffering
damages of theGenoese pirates. In other words, theGenoese living inConstantinople
were held liable for somethingwithwhich they had nothing to do. Their own property
was at risk and they were held liable for the unlawful acts of their countrymen. Logi-
cally, the Genoese community in Constantinople would have been displeased with
this measure, as would other foreign merchants living in the Byzantine capital. If
the emperor could order such a measure against the Genoese, he could also extend
it to other foreigners in similar situations. No Italianmerchant living in the Byzantine
capital would have been thrilled by this measure. For the emperor, who surely strove
for good relations with Italians residing in the capital, the order must have been an
ultimate measure. That emperors sought to preserve good relations with the Italians
is, for example, evident in the commercial and ﬁnancial privileges that the Italians
received in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.17
This emperor’s measure bears a striking resemblance to the so-called ius repre-
saliarum, a practice applied in twelfth-century Europe that stipulated that when an
individual’s claims against a foreign debtor could not be paid, then the claimant
could request payment from a compatriot of the debtor. The compatriot who
paid the debt could then request repayment from the original debtor. This practice,
as described above, was the ﬁrst stage of development in the notion of reprisal, that
being ‘the period of unlimited private self-help in the Middle Ages’18 initiated
16For an analysis of this ‘deposit’ and further legal questions arising from this chrysobull,
see Penna, The Byzantine Imperial Acts (n 6) 175–94.
17For the commercial privileges, see for example, Ralph-Johannes Lilie, Handel und Politik
zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und
Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi: 1081–1204 (AM Hakkert, 1984);
David Jacoby, ‘Italian Privileges and Trade in Byzantium before the Fourth Crusade: A
Reconsideration’ (1994) 24 Annuario de estudios Medievales 349.
18From Matthias Ruffert, ‘Reprisals’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, Oxford Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) http://opil.
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because ‘states did not intervene in the exercise of such action’.19 Travelling mer-
chants applied this practice frequently and often in an uncontrolled way.20 In a
later stage, the state and the political authorities played a role in the development
of reprisals. The ius represaliarum corresponded to a form of collective liability as
it applied to obligations for the payment of debts and damages made by persons of
the same nation. There were some exceptions from this practice. The best-known
exception in the twelfth century was that granted to the students of Bologna by
Frederick I Barbarossa by his constitution Authentica Habita in 1158.21 In order
to promote the study of law in Bologna, Frederick I Barbarossa facilitated the stu-
dents’ residency by excluding them from this practice. Other exceptions to the ius
represaliarum principle included pilgrims and merchants at fairs.
The chosen resolution in our case does not correspond exactly to the ius repre-
saliarum because, as is described in the document, the Byzantine emperor was the
one ordering payment of money as a deposit. It was not those who suffered
damage from the Genoese (namely the Byzantine merchants) who asked for com-
pensation directly from the Genoese living in the Byzantine capital, but rather the
emperor who ordered the Genoese in Constantinople to pay the deposit in favour
of his merchants.22 The emperor had also suffered damage as the pirates had also
stolen valuable gifts from the sultan of Egypt, but in this case – according to the
preserved fragment – the emperor sought a solution, not for himself, but for the
compensation of Byzantine merchants. As is mentioned in the chrysobull to
Genoa from 1193, the emperor took action due to the growing anger and
demand of Byzantine merchants to receive compensation for their losses;23 the
emperor had to do something to calm his subjects. Despite these differences,
the ratio in our case was the same as that encountered in the ius represaliarum:
the Genoese in Constantinople were ordered to pay a deposit as security for
damages inﬂicted by their countrymen upon Byzantine subjects. Their liability
was rooted in their nationality, which they shared with the pirates.
ouplaw.com, under A. Historical Evolution of the Concept of Reprisals. The author gives a
basic historical outline and the current situation of the concept of reprisals with further bib-
liographical references.
19ibid.
20Wilhelm Grewe, Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984)
237.
21See H Koeppler, ‘Frederick Barbarossa and the Schools of Bologna: Some Remarks on
the Authentica Habita’ (1939) 54 The English Historical Review 577.
22See Section III below, however, for a more thorough discussion of the initiation of the
chosen solution and the role of the Byzantine merchants.
23Miklosich and Müller (n 5) doc VII, 41/33–35: ‘ἀγριωτέρως αὐτοῖς ὁ τῶν Κωνσταντι-
νουπολιτῶν ἐπηγείρετο δῆμος, καὶ θερμοτέρως ἐδεῖτο τῆ βασιλείας μου ἐξ αὐτῶν ἱκα-
νωθῆναι τὰ ἀπὸ του τοιούτου πλοίου ἀφαιρεθέντα αὐτῶν…’; and the Latin translation in
Cesare Imperiale di Sant’Angelo (n 5) document no 35, 103/14–17: ‘tum rursus acerbius in
ipsos Constantinopolitanus incitabatur populus et ferventius precabatur maiestatem meam
ut ab iis resarcirentur ea quae ex eo navigio fuerant ablata…’
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A ﬁnal and, in my view, important point of interest in this case concerns the
initiatives for employing such a legal structure. Was it an initiative of the
emperor (more accurately, the imperial court), or was it the Byzantine merchants
who pitched the solution as a means of obtaining security for their losses? Alter-
natively, is it possible that the Genoese community in Constantinople pitched the
idea as an act of goodwill aimed at facilitating their residency and businesses in the
Byzantine capital? This point is interesting since, as noted above, the resolution
closely resembles the ius represaliarum practice applied in other parts of
Europe. This implies that those proposing the solution were familiar with this prac-
tice. In order to better understand the whole incident and the legal frameworks
employed, let us examine the fate of this ‘deposit’, as the emperor calls it. Did
the Byzantine merchants actually receive compensation from the Genoese?
In the same chrysobull from 1193, the emperor mentions the resumption of
negotiations with Genoa following his issuance of the order. Genoese envoys
assured the emperor that Genoa would do its very best to ﬁnd these pirates and
punish them. Having received this assurance, the emperor returned the deposited
money to the Genoese community in Constantinople, thereby restoring relations
between the Byzantine and the Genoese sides. The Genoese envoys conﬁrmed
in an oath that they had, among other things, received the money from the Byzan-
tine guarantors and relayed it back to the Genoese merchants. The corresponding
passage, recounting the envoys’ oath, reads as follows:
… πρὸ πολλοῦ οἱ τοιοῦτοι τοῦ κάστρου
Γενούας ἀπεδιώχθησαν διὰ τὸν
ἐκδεδιῃτημένον αὐτῶν βίον καὶ τὴν ἐν
οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀναστροφὴν, καὶ ἐλάβομεν
ἡμεῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα νομίσματα εἰς εἴκοσι
χιλιάδας ὑπέρπυρα ποσούμενα ἀπὸ
χειρῶν τοῦ Ὀξεοβαφεωπούλου Ἰωάννου
εἰς τὰς ἡμετέρας χεῖρας καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν οἱ
ταῦτα τοῖς ἐγγυηταῖς παραθέμενοι
Γενουΐται πραγματευταὶ οἱ καὶ τῇ
Μεγαλοπόλει κατὰ τὸν νοέμβριον μῆνα
τῆς διελθούσης ἐνδεκάτης ἰνδικτιῶνος
κατ’ ἐμπορίαν προσοκείλαντες μετὰ
τοῦ πλοίου τοῦ Γενουΐτου Ἐρρίκου τοῦ
Νεβιτέλα… 24
… these [the Genoese who pillaged the
ship and stole the goods] have been
‘chased away’ a long time ago from
Genoa because of their degenerate way
of life and their conversion towards evil,
and we have received these coins, to the
amount of 20,000 hyperpyra from the
hands of Oxeobapheopoulos John into
our hands and through us the money was
handed to the Genoese merchants, who
have deposited this [money] to the
guarantors, who came ashore in
Constantinople in the month of
November of the past eleventh indiction,
to trade with the ship of the Genoese
Henricus Nebitella…
24Miklosich and Müller (n 5) doc VII, 44/11–19; and the Latin translation in Cesare Imper-
iale di Sant’Angelo (n 5) document no 35, 105/17–24: ‘sicut a multo tempore illi a civitate
Genuae abacti fuerant propter degenerem ipsorum vitam et non ad bonam conversionem, et
accepimus nos talem pecuniam in viginti mille hyperpyra numeratam a manibus Oxeoba-
pheopuli Ioannis in nostras manus et per nos illi qui sponsoribus deposuerant genuenses
mercatores, quique Constantinopolim mense novembri praeteritae indictionis undecimae
causa mercaturae appulerant cum navigio genuensi Henrici Nevitellae…’
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John Oxeobapheopoulos must have been one of the ‘guarantors’ who kept the
deposited money. He was likely a respected and wealthy individual, for the care of
such a large amount would have demanded a person of high standing.25 The
emperor must have also trusted him, although I do not believe that Oxeobapheo-
poulos had direct links to the imperial milieu or served as a Byzantine ofﬁcial as no
title or function is mentioned in connection with his name. It is also unlikely that
Oxeobapheopoulos was one of the Byzantine merchants victimised by Genoese
pirates, for someone in such a position would have likely resisted relinquishing
the sum prior to receiving actual compensation. The document gives the overall
impression that the Genoese envoys wished to reassure the emperor that the city
of Genoa would do its utmost to locate the Genoese pirates and deliver them to
the Byzantine capital. The envoys ensured the emperor that Genoa would continue
to hunt the Genoese wrongdoers and bring them before the emperor, promising
further to respect all agreements made with the empire. The emperor recounts
that the Genoese envoys beseeched him to forego punishing the entire city of
Genoa for the evil acts of two or three Genoese. The emperor added that
he was ultimately convinced and thus decided to grant a new chrysobull for
Genoa.
It is highly doubtful that the Genoese truly intended to proceed in arresting and
delivering the pirates before Byzantine justice. The pirates were known to the
Genoese and, in fact, their names were even mentioned in the chrysobull. Remark-
ably, the chrysobull even recounts that one of these Genoese pirates, Vaca Buba,
was the nephew of an ofﬁcial Genoese envoy, Balduino Guercio, commissioned to
negotiate with the emperor.26 As mentioned previously, the emperor had ordered
the Genoese in Constantinople to deliver payment in the form of a security
‘deposit’ following the complaints of Byzantine merchants. This pressure essen-
tially compelled the emperor to act. While the emperor had also suffered due to
the loss of valuable gifts from the sultan of Egypt and the murder of Byzantine
ambassadors, his references to the ‘deposit’ are directed solely at the Byzantine
merchants and make no mention of his own losses.27 According to the preserved
documents, the Genoese envoys who negotiated with the emperor on behalf of
25Laiou (n 1) 177 notes that the meaning of John Oxeobapheopoulos’ name (‘red purple
dyer’) clearly connects him to the marketplace, but adds that ‘it is impossible to determine
whether he was a silk manufacturer or a silk merchant or whether this was a family name’.
26Miklosich and Müller (n 5) doc VII, 44/11–19; and the Latin translation in Cesare Imper-
iale di Sant’Angelo (n 5) doc 35, 105/14–15.
27See Miklosich and Müller (n 5) doc VII, 41/20–23. The envoys state that the Genoese
living in Constantinople deposited the money in relation to damage caused to the empire
and to the Byzantine merchants, the murder of the Byzantine envoys on the ship, and the
loss of gifts that were addressed to the emperor by the Sultan of Egypt: ‘παρατεθέντα
αἰτίᾳ τῆς γεγονυίας ζημίας τῇ ἁγίᾳ αὐτοῦ βασιλείᾳ καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις πραγματευταῖς
καὶ τοῦ φόνου τῶν ἀποκρισαρίων … καὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως τῶν φαρίων καὶ ἄλλων αἰγυπ-
τιακῶν ζώων…’: Miklosich and Müller (n 5) doc VII, 43/30–35. The emperor, however,
does not mention that the deposit was given for the loss that his empire suffered (the murder
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Genoa promised that their city would turn against their compatriots who pillaged
the ship, yet there is no mention of any real compensation paid out to the Byzan-
tine merchants. Ultimately, Byzantine imperial documents suggest that neither the
Byzantine merchants nor the emperor ever received real compensation.
Viewed together, the information suggests that the emperor’s position was
weak when negotiating with Genoa. My suspicion is that the emperor’s order
that Genoese residents of Constantinople surrender payments as a ‘deposit’
served only to calm the angry and threatening voices of the Byzantines and thus
postpone the controversy until the piracy incident was ultimately forgotten.
Indeed, this is what happened. The emperor was in a disadvantageous position
to negotiate, for he remained dependent on Italian help. This is evident in imperial
acts directed to the Venetians, who gradually received important commercial pri-
vileges as well as signiﬁcant legal privileges in 1198.28 We must remember that
this was a period of Crusades, when armies and navies travelled through Byzan-
tium on their way to the Holy Land. This was certainly not the right time for an
emperor to make enemies.
III. A ‘Western inﬂuence’ in the emperor’s solution?
The conclusion of this incident is disappointing in respect to Byzantine interests,
but is valuable in unravelling information on the resolution of maritime conﬂicts.
To my knowledge, the resolution proposed by the emperor in the aforementioned
case and the inﬂuence of ius represaliarum is unique. Because the practice of ius
represaliarum was used across Europe throughout the Middle Ages, it is in my
view highly plausible that this emperor’s decision reﬂects some degree of
‘Western inﬂuence’. It seems that we are dealing with an iteration of ius represa-
liarum as it was introduced into Byzantine practice under a slightly different
form.29 In trying to understand the use of a legal structure with clear resemblances
to the ius represaliarum practised in other areas of Europe, we must also address
the source or sources of initiation. In other words, we must question which indi-
vidual or individuals ﬁrst proposed it as a means of resolving the conﬂict.
There are three possibilities. The ﬁrst is that Byzantine merchants proposed
this measure. There is some evidence for such a hypothesis. The emperor opens
the chrysobull of 1193 by recounting how Byzantine merchants had complained
about their losses on a daily basis, petitioning the emperor to grant them
of the envoys and the loss of the gifts) but that it was made because of the damage suffered
by the Byzantine merchants.
28See on this Penna, The Byzantine Imperial Acts (n 6) 62–99, 282–83.
29I have not encountered pre-existing Byzantine practices related to the ius represaliarum.
Justinian by Novel 52 forbids the seizure of someone’s property as a pledge for the debt of
someone else. See Nico van der Wal, ‘Pignoratio’ in Renée IA Nip and others (eds), Media
Latinitatis: A Collection of Essays to Mark the Occasion of the Retirement of Lodewijk Jozel
Engels (Brepols Publishers, 1996) 355–58 with references.
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compensation derived from the estates of Genoese residents of Constantinople.30
The emperor relayed these complaints to an assembly of Genoese residents and
asked them to attend of the matter. According to the emperor, the Genoese
living in the Byzantine capital ﬁrst procrastinated, denying any connection to
the pirates and claiming that their city had long ago expelled such criminals.31
As the Byzantine merchants grew increasingly discontent, the emperor ordered
the solution of the ‘deposit’. While it is unknown whether the Byzantine mer-
chants proposed the actual solution, this Byzantine document reveals that these
merchants ﬁrst made the link between the payment of compensation owed to
them and the Genoese community in Constantinople. Perhaps Byzantine mer-
chants had encountered the practice of ius represaliarum in their travels and, bor-
rowing from it, proposed the idea of a ‘deposit’ to the imperial court. Because this
practice was familiar in the West, the Genoese may have been more willing to
accept it. The Genoese would not have otherwise agreed to the payment of a
deposit in the ﬁrst place. The Byzantine documents do not identify the Byzantine
merchants who had suffered loss from the Genoese and Pisan pirates by name;
rather, they are always referred to as a group, as ‘the merchants’ (‘πραγματευταί’
in Greek and ‘mercatores’ in Latin).
A second possibility is that the Genoese residents of Constantinople proposed
the measure due to increasing fear of the Byzantine merchants. After all, the
Genoese conducted businesses in the Byzantine capital and would thus seek to
avoid initiating bad relations with the Byzantine emperor and the locals. Latins
were not always welcomed in Constantinople and the years before had witnessed
several ﬂares of hostility between Italians and Byzantines in Constantinople.
Many Latins had been slaughtered in the Byzantine capital following the over-
throw of Maria of Antioch, mother and regent of Alexios II Komnenos, by the
anti-Latin Andronikos I Komnenos in 1182. The Genoese and Pisan merchant
quarters in Constantinople suffered the most during these attacks.32 Bitter
30‘ … καὶ τὴν ἐκδίκησιν λιπαρῶς ἐξαιτουμένων καὶ τῆς βασιλείας μου ὁσημέραι δεομέ-
νων, ἐκχωρῆσαι αὐτοῖς ἱκανωθῆναι τὰ πράγματα αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐνταῦθα εὑρισκομένων
Γενουϊτῶν…’: Miklosich and Müller (n 5) doc VII, 41/20–21. See also the Latin trans-
lation in Cesare Imperiale di Sant’Angelo (n 5) doc 35, 103/4–6: ‘et vindictam enixe depos-
centibus et maiestatem meam tota die deprecantibus ut compensari permitteret res eorum a
Genuensibus qui hic inveniuntur… .’
31‘ … ὡς δὲ οὗτοι τὴν τοῦ τηλικούτου πράγματος ἀνεβάλλοντο φροντίδα καὶ ἑαυτῶν
ταύτην ἀποτινάσσεσθαι ἐπείρωντο, τὴν τῶν τολμησάντων τοῦτο κακίαν προβαλλόμμε-
νοι καὶ τὴν διὰ ταύτην ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν πρὸ χρόνων ἤδη πολλῶν ἀποσόβησιν…’:
Miklosich and Müller (n 5) doc VII, 41/29–32. See also the Latin translation in Cesare
Imperiale di Sant’Angelo (n 5) doc 35, 103/11–14: ‘ … at cum hi talis facinoris reiicerent
curam eamque a se removere tentarent, obiicientes malitiam eorum qui id patraverant, eor-
umque a multis annis a propria regione expulsionem… .’
32See for example, Michel Balard, La Romanie Génoise, XIIe – Début du XVe Siècle, 2 vols
(École Française de Rome, 1978) vol 1, 31–33; David Nicole, Byzantium and Venice: A
Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1992) 106–108.
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memories of the massacre were still fresh in the minds of the Genoese living there
and the community would not have risked facing another catastrophe within such a
short time. The incident with the Genoese pirates surely challenged efforts to
restore good relations with the locals, and the idea of temporarily sacriﬁcing
part of their property may have been a smart move for the long-term prosperity
of the Genoese community of the Byzantine capital.
A third possibility is that the solution was initiated by members of the emper-
or’s court, namely by ofﬁcials working at the Imperial chancery. To explore this
possibility, we must examine a particular category of Byzantine ofﬁcials who
orchestrated treaties with Italian cities and may have played a role in engineering
the emperor’s proposed resolution. These ofﬁcers were necessary for conducting
negotiations with Italian envoys and for producing ofﬁcial Latin translations of
Greek documents.33 An ofﬁcial in this position was called an ‘interpreter’ (ἑρμη-
νευτής or διερμηνευτής) and belonged to the staff of the logothetes tou dromou,
the ofﬁce charged with the administration of foreign affairs.34 Until this point, I
have referred to Byzantine documents, including chrysobulls and other letters
addressed to Genoa by the emperor. While the emperor ﬁrst issued these acts in
Greek, all documents were translated into Latin by Byzantine ofﬁcers so that
the Italians – in this case the Genoese – could understand the contents of the docu-
ment. A copy of the original Greek act and its Latin translation were kept in
Byzantine archives while another copy of the original Greek and its Latin trans-
lation was given to the Genoese to take home. Both documents served also as
proof of the agreement between the Byzantine emperor and the Italians – here
the Genoese – and the privileges that it afforded the latter. This information
explains why some of these documents have survived in Italian archives in both
Greek and Latin.35 We know the names of several Byzantine interpreters, and it
is apparent, based on those names, that some were either foreign or of foreign
33On the problems of translating Latin into Greek by Byzantine authorities, see Christian
Gastgeber, ‘Die Lateinische “Übersetzungsabteilung” der byzantinischen Kaiserkanzlei
unter den Komnenen und Angeloi’, 3 vols (PhD dissertation, Vienna 2001); ‘Die Latei-
nische “Übersetzungsabteilung” der byzantinischen Kaiserkanzlei unter den Komnenen
und Angeloi, Neue Ergebnisse zur Arbeit in der byzantinischen Kaiserkanzlei’ in Michel
Balard, Élisabeth Malamut and Jean-Michel Spieser (eds), Byzance et le monde extérieur,
Contacts, relations, échanges (Publications de la Sorbonne, 2005) 105–22.
34On the Byzantine interpreter, see The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium (n 14) vol 2, 1004
with bibliographical references.
35Unfortunately, not all Byzantine imperial documents addressed to Italian cities have sur-
vived in both Greek and Latin. For example, all Byzantine imperial acts to Venice of this
period (tenth to twelfth centuries) have been preserved only in Latin versions, all copies
of the original Latin translation. Some documents have not been preserved at all, and we
only have indirect references to them in other sources. The Byzantine imperial acts directed
to the city of Genoa are kept today in the state archives of Genoa. The sigillion for the
Genoese Guglielmo is kept in the Archivio della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, see
Dölger, 2 (n 1) 333, doc 1660.
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origins. This prompts questions as to the role of foreign interpreters in negotiations
and the formulation of the treaties with the Italians. It is obvious that they were
there to translate, but the questions is whether these ofﬁcers could exert inﬂuence
during the negotiations, whether they could interfere and shape the phrasing of the
ﬁnal texts and, generally speaking, whether they could serve the interests of their
cities on different occasions. We know of one incident in which a foreign
interpreter openly acted in favour of his city.
In 1166, the Byzantine state intended to conﬁscate the estate of Signoretto, a
wealthy Pisan who had died in Constantinople. However, the conﬁscation did not
take place and Signoretto’s estate ended up in Pisan hands following intervention
by the Pisan Leo Tuscus (from Tuscany), an imperial interpreter and with close ties
to the imperial milieu. We know of this incident from a letter, sent to the consuls of
Pisa by Hugo Etheriano, a Pisan living in Constantinople.36 Hugo Etheriano
recounted the matter to the Pisan consuls, adding that Leo Tuscus was a ‘distin-
guished interpreter’ (‘egregius interpres’). This suggests that it was also possible
that Italian interpreters exerted their inﬂuence in our case, proposing to the
emperor in order to quiet the angry voices of Byzantine merchants.
Much later, when the Latin Empire was nearing expiration, the Byzantine
emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos issued a chrysobull for Genoa known as the
treaty of Nymphaion.37 In that document from 1261, the emperor conﬁrmed
earlier privileges granted to the Genoese and described the obligations of both
Byzantium and Genoa. One of the Byzantine obligations was to protect the
Genoese against piracy. It elaborates that pirates who acted against the Genoese
were to be expelled from the empire and prosecuted according to the law.
Seeking to restore relations with Genoa, the emperor assured the Genoese that
none of their compatriots would be held liable for the crimes or debts of other
Genoese.38 Did this clause echo the measures that emperor Isaac II Angelos
36The letter is published in Giuseppe Müller, Documenti sulle Relationi delle città Toscane
coll’Oriente Christiano e coi Turchi ﬁno all’anno MDXXXI (Firenze Cellini, 1879; repr
Societa multigraﬁca editrice, 1966) 11–13, doc X. The case of the Pisan Signoretto was
rather complicated because he is mentioned as a ‘burgensis’ of the emperor Manuel. See
Peter Classen, Burgundio von Pisa, Richter-Gesander-Übersetzer (Sitzungsberichte der
Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos-hist Klasse 4, 1974) 24; Bernard
Hamilton, Janet Hamilton and Sarah Hamilton, Hugh Eteriano, Contra Patarenos (Brill,
2004) 135–41; Penna, The Byzantine Imperial Acts (n 6) 199–203.
37For information and a summary of this document, see Franz Dölger, Regesten der Kaiser-
urkunden des oströmishen Reiches von 565–1453, 3 Teil (revised by Peter Wirth, CH Beck
1977) 73–75, doc 1890. The document has been preserved only as a Latin copy.
38ibid, 73. See Ioannes and Panagiotes Zepos, Jus Graecoromanum, 8 vols (Georgios Fexes
& Son, 1931; repr Aalen 1962) vol 1, 489–90: ‘Item promisit et convenit, quod non impe-
diet vel impediri faciet nec permittet in toto nostro Imperio, quod habet et Dei Misericordia
adquisierit, aliquem Januensem vel de districtu vel dictum Januensum pro facto vel delicto
alterius occasione aliqua in personis vel rebus, sed poena suos teneat auctores, ita quod
caeteri nullum damnum vel laesionem patiantur pro delicto alterius, debito vel rapina.’
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took against the Genoese residents of Constantinople in 1192? As we have seen,
those residents had been held liable for the wrongful acts of their countrymen, and
perhaps later residents of Constantinople (and throughout the empire) sought
assurance that the emperor would not pursue measures against them for the wrong-
doings of other Genoese in the future. Piracy was, after all, a common phenom-
enon in the Mediterranean in the thirteenth century.39 An agreement between
Byzantium and Genoa in 1272, which was ratiﬁed as a treaty in 1275, holds
that the Genoese podesta was competent to punish Genoese pirates who caused
damage to subjects of the empire.40 If these pirates were not caught, the victim
was to be compensated from the wrongdoer’s property after the city of Genoa
had investigated the matter. While it is true that these provisions were aimed as
a response to frequent incidents of piracy around this time,41 it should be added
that they were not completely new. Similar provisions were regulated, for
example, in the ﬁrst preserved chrysobull directed to Genoa by emperor Manuel
I Komnenos in 1169.42 Hence, the treaties of the Byzantine emperors with the
Italian city-states during the Palaiologan period were rooted in earlier Byzantine
documents from before 1204.
IV. Conclusions
The incidents described in this paper, as well as the proposed solution by the
Byzantine emperor, show that Byzantium was not at all isolated from the rest of
the world. I emphasise this because there is still some tendency to present Byzan-
tium as something exotic and oriental, a state that existed in a remote and auton-
omous corner of South-Eastern Europe. But that is certainly not the case.43 The
persisting prejudice toward Byzantium is manifest in the common use of the
word ‘byzantine’ to describe something bureaucratic, difﬁcult to understand or
39Peter Charanis, ‘Piracy in the Aegean during the Reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus’
(1950) X Annuaire de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et Slaves 127, repr
in Peter Charanis, Social, Economic and Political Life in the Byzantine Empire, Collected
Studies (Variorum Ashgate, 1973) XII.
40For a summary and information on this treaty, see Dölger, 3 (n 37) 124–25, doc 2019. See
also Balard (n 32) 52–53 who refers to the negotiations and the conclusion of this treaty
with bibliographical references.
41Charanis (n 39) 134.
42Dölger, 2 (n 1) 255–56, doc 1488. See in detail Penna, The Byzantine Imperial Acts (n 6)
138ff.
43Averil Cameron and Judith Herrin have drawn considerable attention to this problematic
approach to Byzantium and the Byzantines. In many of her writings, Cameron discusses the
continuous absence of Byzantium in works dealing with the history of Europe and the Med-
iterranean. See for example, Averil Cameron, The Byzantines (Blackwell Publishing, 2006)
esp VIII–XII, 1–19; Byzantine Matters (Princeton University Press, 2014). See also Judith
Herrin, Byzantium: The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire (Allen Lane Penguin Books,
2007); Unrivalled Inﬂuence: Women and Empire in Byzantium (Princeton University Press,
2013) 10–11.
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corrupt.44 Byzantium was always in contact with other regions; indeed, one cannot
imagine the opposite for an empire. Particularly in this period, that is to say the
period of Crusades and the rise of commerce, foreign interactions increased and
intensiﬁed. Byzantines were not cut off from others. We should remember that
Byzantine Constantinople was at this time a cosmopolitan city par excellence, a
mosaic of different nations and peoples. The Latin community in Constantinople
was estimated at roughly 60,000 in the 1180s.45 As mentioned above, Italians had
their own districts in the Byzantine capital and in fact occupied important commer-
cial areas. These foreigners lived there for quite some time, and it is inevitable that
Byzantines grew familiar with their practices, customs and laws and engaged in
mutual inﬂuence.
In terms of legal interaction between Byzantium and the West, it is worth men-
tioning that Italian merchants certainly contributed in creating a homogenous mar-
itime law within the medieval Mediterranean. By comparing, for example,
maritime legal provisions in the Byzantine imperial documents for Italians with
similar provisions encountered in the Crusader charters for the same Italian
cities, one observes a mutual inﬂuence between Byzantine documents, on the
one hand, and the Crusader charters, on the other hand.46 In reﬂecting on the
developments of reprisal laws in the medieval Mediterranean, and the degree to
which real contact between Byzantium and the West inﬂuenced these changes,
we can note at least one clause derived from a Crusader charter that was promul-
gated in Pisa by the count of Tripoli Bohemund IV in 1199. With that document,
that Crusader leader assured the Pisans that he would not hold Pisans resident of
Tripoli liable for damages made by their fellow-countrymen.47 It is very tempting,
and fairly possible, to conclude that the clause was inserted in this Crusader charter
to the beneﬁt of Pisans due to the hardships faced by the Genoese in Constantino-
ple when they were held liable by the Byzantine emperor for the wrongful acts of
Genoese pirates.
The structure of our documents corresponds somewhat to the practice of ius
represaliarum as it was applied throughout medieval Western Europe.48 In
1192, when the piracy incident took place and emperor Isaac II Angelos
44Cameron, The Byzantines (n 43) 3–5.
45See Peter Schreiner, ʽUntersuchungen zu den Niederlassungen Westlichen Kauﬂeute im
ByzantinischenReich des 11 und 12 Jahrhunderts’ (1979) 7Byzantinische Forschungen 175.
46See here Laiou (n 1) 179–87. See also Daphne Penna, ‘Similar Problems, Similar Sol-
utions? Byzantine Chrysobulls and Crusader Charters on Legal Issues Regarding the
Italian Maritime Republics’ (paper presented at International Conference ‘Byzantine
Studies Alive!’, Radboud University Nijmegen, 16–17 June 2016: forthcoming 2017 in
the proceedings of this conference).
47See JL La Monte, Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100 to 1291
(Cambridge MA, 1932, repr New York 1970) 271. The charter is published in Müller, Doc-
umenti (n 36) 79–80, no XLIX.
48I say ‘somewhat’ because, as mentioned above, the chosen solution by the emperor is not
identical to the practice of reprisals in that time.
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responded, the concept of reprisal was still in its earliest stages of development.49
In the centuries to follow, the notion of reprisals developed further, evolving from
a primitive self-help tool to a concrete mechanism for enforcing justice for victims
with the necessary approval of political authorities. From the thirteenth century
onward, this ‘public endorsement’ could be witnessed in the ‘letters of marque
or reprisals’ issued by feudal rulers, such as kings, counts, princes etc.50 The
victim ﬁrst sought legal redress before an instance competent to judge the wrong-
doer. If no legal redress was given, the victim could then address his own sover-
eign and ask for justice by bringing forth evidence in support of his claim. If the
sovereign was convinced that the victim had been wrongfully denied justice, the
former then issued letters of reprisals which empowered the victim to recover
losses from the fellow countrymen of the wrongdoer.
In 1354, Bartolus de Saxoferrato, one of the most prominent medieval jurists,
wrote the ﬁrst treatise on reprisals, the Tractatus Represaliarum, and justiﬁed their
use in contemporary Italy. According to Bartolus, reprisal was an extreme measure
requiring the use of force and should only be applied when truly needed and only
under the condition that all other options for awarding justice had been
exhausted.51 Scholars have discussed the relation between Bartolus’ theory on rep-
risals and the law of war (ius belli),52 and some scholars have traced inﬂuences of
Roman law in the creation of Bartolus’ doctrine on reprisals.53 In 1360, the Bolog-
nian canonist Giovanni da Legnano (John of Legnano) built his Tractatus de bello,
de represaliis et de duello upon Bartolus’ ideas on reprisals. In the centuries that
followed, the concept of reprisal acquired new forms, and today the term continues
to be used in international law to describe countermeasures in times of war.54
The preceding discussion has referred to a speciﬁc legal structure used in the
resolution of a maritime conﬂict between the Byzantines and the Genoese in the
late-twelfth century. The chosen structure represents an interesting juncture
49On the development of the notion of reprisals, see Ruffert (n 18).
50For these letters and the evolution of the ius represaliarum, see Grewe (n 20) esp 144–47,
237–40, 428ff, 616ff. See also Ruffert (n 18); Michael Hurst Keen, The Laws of War in the
Late Middle Ages (Routledge & Kegan Paul and University of Toronto Press, 1965) 218–
38.
51See in detail Cecil N Sidney Woolf, Bartolus of Sassoferrato: His Position in the History
of Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1913) 203–207; Keen (n 50)
219–21.
52See for example, Grewe (n 20) 145–46; Keen (n 50) 219–21. See also Karl-Heinz Ziegler,
Völkerrechtsgeschichte: Ein Studienbuch (CH Beck, 2nd edn 2007) 109–10.
53See Laurens Winkel, ‘Fransisco de Vitoria on Just War on Both Sides and on the Legal
Position of Burgundy’ (2007) 75(3) Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 355–62, 358;
Jacob Giltaij, ʻRoman Law and the causa legitima for Reprisal in Bartolus’ (2014) 20(1)
Fundamina special issue, Meditationes de iure et historia: Essays in honour of Laurens
Winkel 349.
54For a brief description of the current situation of reprisals and the historical development,
see Ruffert (n 18) with an additional, basic bibliography.
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between the Eastern and the Western legal traditions. It bore notable resemblance
to the practice of ius represaliarum applied in Western Europe at that time, even if
the practice was not fully executed and failed to provide Byzantine merchants with
their desired compensation, at least based on the evidence available from Byzan-
tine imperial documents. An interesting element is that the Byzantine merchants
ﬁrst entreated the emperor for permission in seeking compensation from the
Genoese community in the Byzantine capital. They considered the emperor’s per-
mission necessary as such an approval would have legitimised their actions against
the Genoese. Thus, the case examined represents a distant forerunner of the ‘letters
of marque or reprisals’ that appeared in later centuries, when the concept of rep-
risals fully developed. It seems that we are in a very early and primitive stage in the
development of that concept. The emperor did not allow the Byzantine merchants
to directly address and ask for compensation from the Genoese community, but
rather create the solution of the ‘deposit’ which, as described above, resembles
the contemporary practice of ius represaliarum.
In addition, the legal structure described in these Byzantine documents proves,
I believe, just how practical the custom of the ius represaliarum truly was. This is
witnessed by further developments to the notion of reprisals in international law in
the following centuries, as well as its role in resolving disputes and conﬂicts.55 It is
interesting to see how a custom ‘born’ from the needs of travelling merchants
became so practical and, gradually, developed to take on different forms and
greatly inﬂuence the ﬁeld of international law in medieval and early modern
Europe. Once again, the link between customs, merchants and maritime laws in
the Middle Ages is evident. The case discussed in this paper illustrates how
Byzantine practice appropriated a merchants’ custom linked to Western Europe,
a custom that later inﬂuenced the ﬁeld of international law in medieval and
early modern Europe.
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